The MATCH Act Wants to Cut Off China’s Last Semiconductor Export Controls Loophole

• The MATCH Act would extend US semiconductor export controls to block China from buying and servicing DUV lithography tools that it cannot make itself
• South Korean and Taiwanese chipmakers with China fabs are directly exposed, as Beijing accelerates a push for 80% chip self-sufficiency by 2030

Washington has been tightening semiconductor export controls on China for years. The MATCH Act, introduced in the House of Representatives on April 2, suggests the next round will be the most consequential yet, and its ripple effects will be felt hardest in Asia.

The draft legislationintroduced by a cross-party group of US lawmakers, is aimed at protecting the US lead in artificial intelligence by preventing Chinese companies from obtaining chip manufacturing tools they cannot make themselves, while ensuring that companies based in US-allied nations face the same restrictions as their US rivals.

The primary target is ASML’s deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography systems–the machines that etch circuit patterns onto silicon wafers and that China’s biggest fabs have, until now, still been able to purchase. The MATCH Act explicitly names the Chinese companies affected: SMIC, Hua Hong, Huawei, CXMT, and YMTC would no longer be allowed to purchase or have chip manufacturing machines serviced.

That last word–serviced–is the detail that changes everything.

Why servicing matters more than sales

Manufacturing tools are not appliances that you set up once and leave alone. Without support, calibration, parts supply, and technical assistance, not only does availability decline, but process stability diminishes in the medium term. The draft thus targets not only the influx of new tools but potentially also the usability of already-installed systems.

China has acquired hundreds of DUV machines from ASML over the past several years, and China was ASML’s biggestmarket in the fourth quarter of 2025, representing 36% of net system sales. Cutting off maintenance on that installed base is a different proposition from simply halting new sales; it creates operational degradation over time rather than a clean break.

For ASML, the financial exposure is significant. Analysts at Quilter Cheviot estimate the legislation would impact around 10–15% of ASML’s overall sales, with China accounting for approximately 50% of that mix, a potential revenue hit of around 5%.

Where Asia gets complicated

The MATCH Act’s reach does not stop at China’s borders. ASML has recently received large orders from allies such as SK Hynix and Samsung, highlighting how demand is spread across multiple regionsbut both South Korean memory giants run significant manufacturing operations inside China, operations that depend on a steady flow of equipment and service.

Washington approved annual export licences for Samsung and SK Hynix at the start of 2026, replacing the validated end-user waiver system that had allowed relatively unrestricted tool shipments to their Chinese factories. Those licences cover maintenance and continued operation, not capacity expansion.

The MATCH Act, if passed, would put even that level of access under threat. Samsung’s NAND flash plant in Xi’an and SK Hynix’s DRAM fab in Wuxi and NAND facility in Dalian collectively account for a meaningful share of global memory supply. Any disruption to tool servicing at those sites touches supply chains that run through every major consumer electronics market in Asia.

The picture at SEMICON China 2026 captured the direction of travel. Applied Materials and ASML kept a low profile at the event under tightening US export controls, while domestic Chinese suppliers dominated visibility and floor presence.

China is already responding

The recurring argument against tightening semiconductor export controls further is that the restrictions have historically accelerated exactly what they sought to prevent. US measures are proving more successful at catalysing genuine Chinese chip innovation than at blocking it, manifested in recent achievements in advanced packaging, alternative forms of lithography, and novel system architecture.

China’s semiconductor industry has set a target of 80% chip self-sufficiency by 2030, with plans to build and test production lines using fully domestically developed equipment for 7nm chips, as well as achieving stable production at 14nm. China’s chip self-sufficiency rate stood at 33% in 2024.

Beijing has already mandated that chipmakers use at least 50% domestically produced equipment when adding new manufacturing capacity, a policy reshaping procurement decisions across the country’s fab build-out. Naura, China’s largest semiconductor equipment supplier, is reportedly testing its etching tools on SMIC’s advanced 7nm production line, building on earlier deployments at 14nm.

UBS projects China’s semiconductor equipment spending will reach US$47.05 billion in 2026, rising to US$50 billion in 2027–growth driven by memory expansion, high fab utilisation, and the ongoing push to close the gap in leading-edge logic.

The legislative road ahead

Both analysts covering ASML noted that the proposals are in their early stages and would still need to work through the American legislative process. Unlike previous rounds of export restrictions, which were driven by the executive branch under Presidents Trump and Biden, this initiative originates from Congress, signalling a broader political consensus around technology competition with China.

Whether or not the MATCH Act passes in its current form, the direction it signals is clear. The era of China being able topurchase and maintain Western lithography tools as a matter of course is ending. Asian chipmakers with China operationsnow face a narrowing set of options on both sides of the trade divide — and the MATCH Act has not even passed yet.

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